caps

const (

	/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
	overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
	ownership. */
	CAP_CHOWN = 0
	/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
	[_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
	CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
	CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE = 1
	/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
	and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
	defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
	CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH = 2
	/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
	file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
	is applicable. It doesn’t override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
	CAP_FOWNER = 3
	/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
	shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
	bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
	supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
	the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
	cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
	CAP_FSETID = 4
	/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
	process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
	of the process receiving the signal. */
	CAP_KILL = 5
	/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation

	Allows setgroups(2)

	Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
	CAP_SETGID = 6
	/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid).

	Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
	CAP_SETUID = 7
	/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
	Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
	remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
	With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
	Add any capability from current’s capability bounding set
	to the current process’ inheritable set
	Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
	Allow modification of the securebits for a process
	*/
	CAP_SETPCAP = 8
	/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
	CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE = 9
	/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024

	Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
	CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE = 10
	/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
	CAP_NET_BROADCAST = 11
	/* Allow interface configuration

	Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting

	Allow setting debug option on sockets

	Allow modification of routing tables

	Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
	sockets

	Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_RAW)

	Allow setting TOS (type of service)

	Allow setting promiscuous mode

	Allow clearing driver statistics

	Allow multicasting

	Allow read/write of device-specific registers

	Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
	CAP_NET_ADMIN = 12
	/* Allow use of RAW sockets

	Allow use of PACKET sockets

	Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via NET_ADMIN) */
	CAP_NET_RAW = 13
	/* Allow locking of shared memory segments

	Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn’t really have anything to do
	with IPC) */
	CAP_IPC_LOCK = 14
	/* Override IPC ownership checks */
	CAP_IPC_OWNER = 15
	/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
	CAP_SYS_MODULE = 16
	/* Allow ioperm/iopl access

	Allow sending USB messages to any device via /dev/bus/usb */
	CAP_SYS_RAWIO = 17
	/* Allow use of chroot() */
	CAP_SYS_CHROOT = 18
	/* Allow ptrace() of any process */
	CAP_SYS_PTRACE = 19
	/* Allow configuration of process accounting */
	CAP_SYS_PACCT = 20
	/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key

	Allow administration of the random device

	Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas

	Allow setting the domainname

	Allow setting the hostname

	Allow calling bdflush()

	Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection

	Allow some autofs root ioctls

	Allow nfsservctl

	Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ

	Allow to read/write pci config on alpha

	Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize)

	Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush)

	Allow removing semaphores

	Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
	and shared memory

	Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment

	Allow turning swap on/off

	Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing

	Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices

	Allow setting geometry in floppy driver

	Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver

	Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
	extra ioctls)

	Allow tuning the ide driver

	Allow access to the nvram device

	Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device

	Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver

	Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space

	Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver

	Allow setting up serial ports

	Allow sending raw qic-117 commands

	Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
	arbitrary SCSI commands

	Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem

	Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
	CAP_SYS_ADMIN = 21
	/* Allow use of reboot() */
	CAP_SYS_BOOT = 22
	/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
	UID) processes

	Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
	processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
	process.

	Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */
	CAP_SYS_NICE = 23
	/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits.

	Override quota limits.

	Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem

	Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
	resources)

	NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
	you can override using fsuid too

	Override size restrictions on IPC message queues

	Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock

	Override max number of consoles on console allocation

	Override max number of keymaps */
	CAP_SYS_RESOURCE = 24
	/* Allow manipulation of system clock

	Allow irix_stime on mips

	Allow setting the real-time clock */
	CAP_SYS_TIME = 25
	/* Allow configuration of tty devices

	Allow vhangup() of tty */
	CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG = 26
	/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
	CAP_MKNOD = 27
	/* Allow taking of leases on files */
	CAP_LEASE = 28
	/* Allow writing the audit log via unicast netlink socket */
	CAP_AUDIT_WRITE = 29
	/* Allow configuration of audit via unicast netlink socket */
	CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL = 30
	/* Set capabilities on files. */
	CAP_SETFCAP = 31
	/* Override MAC access.
	The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
	An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
	to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
	the capability it should use to do so. */
	CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE = 32
	/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
	The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
	An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
	to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
	policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
	capability it should use to do so. */
	CAP_MAC_ADMIN = 33
	/* Allow configuring the kernel’s syslog (printk behaviour) */
	CAP_SYSLOG = 34
	/* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */
	CAP_WAKE_ALARM = 35
	/* Allow preventing system suspends */
	CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND = 36
	/* Allow reading the audit log via multicast netlink socket */
	CAP_AUDIT_READ = 37
	/* Allow system performance and observability privileged operations using
	perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems. */
	CAP_PERFMON = 38
	/*
		CAP_BPF allows the following BPF operations:
		- Creating all types of BPF maps
		- Advanced verifier features
		- Indirect variable access
		- Bounded loops
		- BPF to BPF function calls
		- Scalar precision tracking
		- Larger complexity limits
		- Dead code elimination
		- And potentially other features
		- Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data
		- Retrieve xlated and JITed code of BPF programs
		- Use bpf_spin_lock() helper
		* CAP_PERFMON relaxes the verifier checks further:
		- BPF progs can use of pointer-to-integer conversions
		- speculation attack hardening measures are bypassed
		- bpf_probe_read to read arbitrary kernel memory is allowed
		- bpf_trace_printk to print kernel memory is allowed
		* CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to use bpf_probe_write_user.
		* CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate system wide loaded
		programs, maps, links, BTFs and convert their IDs to file descriptors.
		* CAP_PERFMON and CAP_BPF are required to load tracing programs.
		CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF are required to load networking programs.
	*/
	CAP_BPF = 39
	/* Allow checkpoint/restore related operations

	Allow PID selection during clone3()

	Allow writing to ns_last_pid */
	CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE = 40

	MaxCapabilityNumber = 40
)

const (
	LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 = 1
	LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 = 2
	LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 = 2
)

const LibcapSemVer = "2.69"