spire-tpm-plugin

SPIRE TPM Plugin

This repository contains agent and server plugins for SPIRE to allow TPM 2-based node attestation.

Menu

• Quick start
• How it Works
• Building
• Contributions
• License
• Code of Conduct
• Security Vulnerability Reporting

Demo

Here's a quick demo that shows how this plugin looks when run:

Quick Start

Before starting, create a running SPIRE deployment and add the following configuration to the agent and server:

Agent Configuration

NodeAttestor "tpm" {
	plugin_cmd = "/path/to/plugin_cmd"
	plugin_checksum = "sha256 of the plugin binary"
	plugin_data {
	}
}

Server Configuration

NodeAttestor "tpm" {
	plugin_cmd = "/path/to/plugin_cmd"
	plugin_checksum = "sha256 of the plugin binary"
	plugin_data {
		ca_path = "/opt/spire/.data/certs"
		hash_path = "/opt/spire/.data/hashes"
	}
}

Directory Configuration

For this plugin to work, either ca_path, hash_path, or both must be configured.

Certificate Directory

Contains the manufacturer CA cert that signed the TPM's EK certificate in PEM or DER format. Drop all manufacturer CA certs in the directory ca_path.

Note: not all TPM's have an EK certificate, if yours does not then use hash_path

Hash Directory

Contains empty files named after the EK public key hash. Use the get_tpm_pubhash command to print out the TPM's EK public key hash. Example:

agent  $ ./get_tpm_pubhash
1b5bbe2e96054f7bc34ebe7ba9a4a9eac5611c6879285ceff6094fa556af485c 

server $ mkdir -p /opt/spire/.data/hashes
server $ touch /opt/spire/.data/hashes/1b5bbe2e96054f7bc34ebe7ba9a4a9eac5611c6879285ceff6094fa556af485c

How it Works

The plugin uses TPM credential activation as the method of attestation. The plugin operates as follows:

1. Agent generates AK (attestation key) using TPM
2. Agent sends the AK attestation parameters and EK certificate or public key to the server
3. Server inspects EK certificate or public key
   1. If hash_path exists, and the public key hash matches filename in hash_path, validation passes
   2. If ca_path exists, and the EK certificate was signed by any chain in ca_path, validation passes
4. If validation passed, the server generates a credential activation challenge using
   1. The EK public key
   2. The AK attestation parameters
5. Server sends challenge to agent
6. Agent decrypts the challenge's secret
7. Agent sends back decrypted secret
8. Server verifies that the decrypted secret is the same it used to build the challenge
9. Server creates a SPIFFE ID in the form of spiffe://<trust_domain>/agent/tpm/<sha256sum_of_tpm_pubkey>
10. All done!

For info on how TPM attestation usually works and how this implementation differs, visit TPM.md.

Building

To build this plugin on Linux, run make build. Because of the dependency on go-attestation, you must have libtspi-dev installed.

Contributions

We ❤ contributions.

Have you had a good experience with this project? Why not share some love and contribute code, or just let us know about any issues you had with it?

We welcome issue reports here; be sure to choose the proper issue template for your issue, so that we can be sure you're providing the necessary information.

Before sending a Pull Request, please make sure you read our Contribution Guidelines.

License

Please read the LICENSE file.

Code of Conduct

This project has adopted a Code of Conduct. If you have any concerns about the Code, or behavior which you have experienced in the project, please contact us at opensource@bloomberg.net.

Security Vulnerability Reporting

If you believe you have identified a security vulnerability in this project, please send email to the project team at opensource@bloomberg.net, detailing the suspected issue and any methods you've found to reproduce it.

Please do NOT open an issue in the GitHub repository, as we'd prefer to keep vulnerability reports private until we've had an opportunity to review and address them.